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Abstract 
 The last few decades in China have seen unprecedented economic growth.  This 
growth, though good for the economy, has had extreme consequences on the health of 
Chinese citizens as well as the environment as a whole.  A major factor of this increased 
pollution is the country’s high consumption of coal, which has rarely comprised less than 
70 percent of the country’s energy during the past 50 years.  Though the media portrays a 
China which is making enormous strides in the field of environmental protection, the 
energy and environmental policies of the country suggest that it will continue using large 
amounts of coal in the years to come.  This thesis project attempts to discover the 
underlying reasons for China’s coal policy and how it is affected by economic, 
environmental, and social factors within the country.  It argues that although 
environmental and social factors are playing an increasingly significant role, these 
policies are still driven by economic concerns.  Until the country places more stress on 
environmental concerns, coal will continue to play a large role in its energy policy.  
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Fueling the Dragon’s Fire: China’s Coal Policy 
Introduction: 
The last few decades in China have seen unprecedented economic growth.  The 
country’s GDP has grown at an average of almost ten percent annually for the past 30 
years, the fastest growth of any country in recorded history.1   In the last ten years alone, 
its economy has tripled in size, becoming the second largest behind that of the United 
States.2  This growth has understandably increased the energy demand, causing it to 
double from 2000 to 2011, from 1,108 Mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent) to 2,271 
Mtoe.3  In order to meet this demand, China has increased its coal consumption, which 
historically has played an important role in sourcing the region’s energy.  Over the last 50 
years, coal has rarely comprised less than 70 percent of the country’s energy use.4  Today, 
China is the world’s largest consumer of coal, responsible for almost half of the world’s 
annual consumption.5  Over the span of ten years, from 2000 to 2010, coal use and 
emissions increased at an annual average rate of nine percent.  To put this in perspective,  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Xiaodong	  Zhu,	  “Understanding	  China’s	  Growth:	  Past,	  Present,	  and	  Future,”	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  
Perspectives,	  26(4):	  103-­‐24,	  doi:	  10.1257/jep.26.4.103.	  	  	  
2	  Jane	  A.	  Leggett,	  “China’s	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Emissions	  and	  Mitigation	  Policies,”	  (paper	  presented	  to	  the	  
112th	  Congress,	  Washington,	  DC,	  July	  18,	  2011).	  	  
3	  Dennis	  Best	  and	  Ellina	  Levina,	  “Facing	  China’s	  Coal	  Future:	  Prospects	  and	  Challenges	  for	  Carbon	  Capture	  
and	  Storage,”	  (working	  paper,	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2012).	  	  
4	  Jianjun	  Tu,	  “Coal	  Mining	  Safety:	  China’s	  Achille’s	  Heel,”	  China	  Security	  3(2):36-­‐53.	  
5	  Joseph	  Ayoub,	  “China	  Produces	  and	  Consumes	  Almost	  as	  Much	  Coal	  as	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  Combined,”	  
U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  May	  14,	  2014,	  
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16271.	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in the year 2010 alone, China’s coal-fired power generation capacity increased by an 
amount equal to Germany’s entire existing generating capacity.6   
Unfortunately, this rapid development and extensive coal use have caused a 
number of severe environmental problems.  Coal is the cause of approximately 90 percent 
of China’s sulfur dioxide emissions and as much as half of its particle emissions, 
including PM2.5.7  China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, including 
carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide, and home to 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the 
world.8  Coal extraction, which demands around 0.5 tons of water for every 1-2 tons of 
coal extracted, is also a major contributor to desertification and water pollution in the 
country.9  In recent years, it seems that China has made a concerted effort to reduce 
pollution and decrease coal use, yet the material is still responsible for around 65 percent 
of the country’s total energy consumption.10  This issue is not black and white, however, 
but rather multi-faceted; besides environmental concerns, there are many economic 
factors for the Chinese government to consider when constructing its energy policy.   
This paper aims to discover the different aspects effecting China’s coal policy and 
discover why the PRC has chosen to persist in its heavy coal use.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Li	  Shuo	  and	  Lauri	  Myllyvirta,	  “The	  End	  of	  China’s	  Coal	  Boom,”	  Greenpeace,	  April	  11,	  2014,	  	  
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2014/The-­‐End-­‐of-­‐
Chinas-­‐Coal-­‐Boom.pdf.	  
7	  Beina	  Xu,	  “China’s	  Environmental	  Crisis,”	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  April	  25,	  2014,	  
http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-­‐environmental-­‐crisis/p12608.	  
8	  Keith	  Wagstaff,	  “China’s	  Massive	  Pollution	  Problem.”	  The	  Week,	  November	  9,	  2013,	  
http://theweek.com/articles/456979/chinas-­‐massive-­‐pollution-­‐problem.	  
9	  Zheng	  Li	  et	  al.	  “Assessing	  Water	  Issues	  in	  China’s	  Coal	  Industry,”	  CornerStone,	  April	  11,	  2014,	  
http://cornerstonemag.net/assessing-­‐water-­‐issues-­‐in-­‐chinas-­‐coal-­‐industry/.	  
10	  Shuo	  and	  Myllyvirta,	  “The	  End	  of	  China’s	  Coal	  Boom.”	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Research Question: 
This study will analyze the PRC’s competing and seemingly contradictory policy 
goals of economic growth and environmental preservation through a case study of 
China’s coal policy.  It seeks to discover the rationale behind China’s coal policy, or lack 
thereof, and answer the question of how China’s coal use is affected by economic, 
environmental, and social goals, as well as how these policy goals differ at national and 
provincial levels.   
Why does Coal Matter? 
It is of the upmost importance to study and understand the PRC’s policy on coal 
because its coal use has enormous environmental, economic, and political implications, 
not only for China, but also the world.  Air pollution caused through the burning of coal 
in China, does not stay within the country’s borders, but rather moves through the 
atmosphere according to air currents.  A study published in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences in 2013 found that 12 to 24 percent of the sulfate pollution 
in the western United States originated from China.11  This is a staggering amount, 
especially considering that the West Coast of the U.S. is more than 6,000 miles away 
from China’s eastern coast.  Countries closer to the region, such as Japan and South 
Korea, suffer from even higher levels of pollution originating in China.12  China’s carbon 
dioxide emissions, which increase at an average annual rate of 500 million tons, are 
counterproductive to the environmental efforts of the United States and Europe, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Jintai	  Lin	  et	  al.,	  “China’s	  International	  Trade	  and	  air	  Pollution	  in	  the	  United	  States,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  111(2013),	  doi:	  10.1073/pnas.1312860111.	  
12	  Julian	  Ryall	  and	  Audrey	  Yoo,	  “Japan,	  South	  Korea	  Concerned	  that	  China’s	  Smog	  Will	  Affect	  Them,”	  South	  
China	  Morning	  Post,	  November	  6,	  2013.	  	  http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1348605/japan-­‐
south-­‐korea-­‐concerned-­‐chinas-­‐smog-­‐will-­‐affect-­‐them	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have worked to cut their own emissions by 60 million tons annually.13  According to a 
report by Greenpeace in 2014, China’s coal consumption is the single most important 
determinant for the world’s future climate.14  The consequences of such heavy pollution 
are more numerous and severe than global warming alone; the World Health 
Organization estimates that in 2012, one in every eight deaths worldwide was caused by 
exposure to air pollution.15  With worse air records now than just two or three years ago, 
it is imperative to analyze critically the causes of such pollution and the rationale behind 
China’s energy policy.   
China’s coal policy also has a huge effect on the world economy.  Cleaner energy, 
such as solar or nuclear power, is significantly more expensive than coal.  Changing the 
nature of China’s energy source would therefore cost billions of yuan and potentially 
have a large impact on the country’s economy.  Moreover, although the majority of 
China’s coal is mined domestically, it is still the world’s largest importer of coal, 
importing around 289 million tons in 2012 alone.16  Were China to stop using coal as its 
main energy source, it would no longer need to import such huge quantities of the 
material, which would have a hugely negative impact on the global coal trade.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “The	  East	  is	  Grey,”	  The	  Economist,	  August	  10,	  2013.	  
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-­‐china-­‐worlds-­‐worst-­‐polluter-­‐largest-­‐investor-­‐green-­‐
energy-­‐its-­‐rise-­‐will-­‐have.	  
14	  Shuo	  and	  Myllyvirta,	  “The	  End	  of	  China’s	  Coal	  Boom.”	  
15	  “7	  Million	  Premature	  Deaths	  Annually	  Linked	  to	  Air	  Pollution,”	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  March	  25,	  
2014,	  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-­‐pollution/en/.	  
	  
16	  “Coal	  Statistics,”	  World	  Coal	  Association,	  September,	  2014,	  http://www.worldcoal.org/resources/coal-­‐
statistics/.	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would also effect the economies of the countries exporting coal to China, especially those 
of Indonesia and Australia, who together provide 70 percent of the imported coal.17   
Thirdly, understanding how China’s coal policy is effected by economic and 
environmental concerns also gives one insight into how the PRC prioritizes and balances 
these differing policy goals.  Although the PRC has traditionally focused all of its energy 
and funds into developing the economy, its economic success over the last two decades, 
as well as rising environmental concerns, are causing many of its citizens to question this 
method of development.  Indeed, the general feeling towards pollution in the country as 
of late has been deep concern and even frustration.18  In such a sensitive political 
environment, the government must work to ensure that this concern does not turn into 
anger if it wishes to stay politically stable.  Therefore, it is critical that the PRC finds the 
right balance between environmental and economic objectives.   
Hypothesis: 
Based on my previous knowledge of the PRC and my preliminary research, I 
hypothesize that although environmental concerns have increasingly more influence on 
China’s coal policy and may indeed be contributing to cleaner coal use, the policy is still 
ultimately guided by economic goals.  The reasoning behind my hypothesis is simply that 
it would appear that China continues heavy coal use despite the environmental 
degradation which it is causing.  Moreover, with a slowing economy, I would assume that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Kevin	  Jianjun	  Tu	  and	  Sabine	  Johnson-­‐Reiser,	  “Understanding	  China’s	  Rising	  Coal	  Imports,”	  	  Carnegie	  
Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  February	  16,	  2012,	  
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/china_coal.pdf.	  
18	  Yihui	  Zhao,	  “People’s	  Responses	  to	  the	  Beijing	  haze	  Episode	  via	  Chinese	  Micro-­‐Blogging	  Website”	  
(master’s	  thesis,	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia,	  2013).	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the Chinese government would work to prolong the economic boom which the country 
has enjoyed for the past decade.     
Limitations 
This paper has certain limitations.  The most prominent of these is the difficulty 
finding accurate information.  There exists a discrepancy between the official information 
published by the Chinese government and the information published by other 
organizations.  Each source provides a different narrative of the situation, especially in 
regards to coal use and emissions, China’s official numbers on both of these topics are 
always much smaller than those provided by international organizations.  China has been 
known in the past to exaggerate their successes and downplay its losses, meaning that the 
information available to the public may not be entirely accurate.19  China has great 
incentive to do this, since coming across as environmentally proactive is extremely 
beneficial to its image, not only abroad but also within its own borders, as more and more 
of its citizens are demanding actions against the pollution problem.  Even if the Chinese 
government reports the exact figures it is given, it is still likely that the statistics are 
skewed, as many business owners find loopholes in the legislation or simply break the 
law in order to continue using coal by the cheapest means possible.  One common 
example of this is that although owners of power plants and factories install the 
desulphurization technology required of them by law, many do not actually turn it on so 
that they don’t have to pay the cost.  Thus, the government may in fact believe that more 
is being done to protect the environment than is actually taking place.20  Although some 
facts and figures given in this paper may therefore be slightly off, they represent the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Tu,	  “China’s	  Problematic	  Coal	  Plan.”	  	  	  
20	  “China	  Strives	  to	  Clean	  up	  Pollution.”	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accurate knowledge available to the international community and should still provide 
insight into the reality of the situation. 
Another limitation of this paper is the rate of change and reform of China’s coal 
policy.  The country is currently undergoing a period of reform in which the 
environmental and energy policies are changing rapidly.  There is a lag in the time it 
takes to publish information from the time it takes place, meaning that most of the 
information available on China’s current coal policy is a few years old and therefore does 
not actually represent the country’s current policy.  Even the newest information and 
statistics on the topic are soon outdated.  This paper embodies my best effort in writing 
an accurate research paper despite these limitations. 
Literature Review: 
The foundation for this study is “The Apparent ‘Paradox’ of China’s Energy 
Policy,” published in Asian Survey in 2012.  In this paper, Lynette Ong discusses China’s 
contradictory climate policy.  China is enthusiastically expanding its renewable energy 
industry, yet, extremely reluctant to commit to international emissions reduction 
agreements.  Ong argues that this contradiction is due to the country’s goal of economic 
growth, as the renewable energy industry is largely untapped and can therefore be easily 
monopolized and bring in large amounts of revenue.  Refusing to pledge to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions allows the country to continue using cheap energy, namely 
coal, and therefore easily maintain and grow its economy.21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Lynette	  H.	  Ong,	  “The	  Apparent	  “Paradox”	  in	  China’s	  Climate	  Policies:	  Weak	  International	  Commitment	  
on	  Emissions	  Reduction	  and	  Aggressive	  Renewable	  Energy	  Policy,”	  Asian	  Survey	  52(2012):	  1138-­‐1160.	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Another narrative of the situation is provided by Tim Wright, who argues in his 
book “The Political Economy of the Chinese Coal Industry,” that coal is a source of 
conflict between the central and local governments.  Although the central government is 
working to decrease coal consumption and has created policies aimed at doing so, its 
plans are undermined by the local governments charged with implementing national 
policies.  This frustration of policies is due to the contradiction of central and local 
government objectives.  While the central government wants to reduce reliance on coal 
for reasons including environmental protection, sustainability, and social stability, local 
governments are more concerned with economic growth and development, and thus see 
benefits in continued coal use.  For this reason, local governments are reluctant to, and in 
many cases do not, enforce policies which they find unbeneficial.22  
Methodology: 
This paper will implement an explanatory mixed methods approach to analyze the 
coal policy of the PRC.  Quantitative research in the form of governmental and scientific 
reports will serve as the basis for my study.  A contextual analysis of qualitative sources 
will then be conducted in order to better understand this data.  This analysis will search 
for clues of how economic and environmental policy goals effect China’s coal use.  One 
of the most important pieces of literature on the subject is China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015), which sets environmental and energy goals for the country and therefore 
provides a good indication of the direction in which these areas are headed.  Using the 
goals laid out in this plan, as well as official statements made by Chinese officials to the 
press, I will first define China’s coal policy.  Next, I will use my analytical findings to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Tim	  Wright,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Coal	  Industry:	  Black	  Gold	  and	  Blood-­‐Stained	  Coal,	  
(New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2012).	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outline the causal relationship between my independent variables (economic and 
environmental policy goals) and dependent variable (PRC coal use).   
This paper is organized into 5 chapters: China’s coal policy, trends in coal use, 
economic policy goals, environmental policy goals, and effects of social pressure.  
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Chapter 1: China’s Coal Policy 
Before unpacking the motives behind China’s coal policy, we must first define 
what their policy is and how it is created.  Due to the nature of coal and its overlap into 
multiple sectors, China’s energy and environmental policies must both be studied to gain 
a comprehensive understanding of China’s coal policies.   
Government Organizations and Mechanisms: 
 The formulation of China’s coal policy is extremely decentralized.  Three separate 
executive-level government agencies are responsible for coal policy: the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).  Within these agencies are located 
multiple smaller organizations which all share in the responsibilities associated with 
developing the country’s coal policy, both from the energy and environmental 
perspective.  The most important of these organizations are outlined below:   
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Figure 1.1 Structure of Government Organizations and Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Created by author from information attained from Christopher Burke, Johanna Jansson, and 
Wenran Jiang. “Formulation of Energy Policy in China: Key Actors and Recent Developments.” Centre for 
Chinese Studies. January, 2009 and “Department of Climate Change,” National Development and Reform 
Commission People’s Republic of China. 
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), or 中华人民共和
国国家发张和改革委员会，is one of the largest administrative agencies under the State 
Council, managing more than 26 departments and bureaus.  As an organization mostly 
concerned with state planning and macroeconomics, the responsibilities of the NDRC 
vary widely; its various departments are in charge of energy, environmental protection, 
employment, foreign enterprises, industry, natural resources, social development, 
transportation, and trade.23  Due to the fact that the NDRC is the primary authority over 
both the energy and environmental protection sectors, it plays a disproportionately large 
role in China’s coal policy formulation in comparison to the MEP and MFA.  Two 
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  Christopher	  Burke,	  Johanna	  Jansson,	  and	  Wenran	  Jiang.	  “Formulation	  of	  Energy	  Policy	  in	  China:	  Key	  
Actors	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  Recent	  Developments.”	  Centre	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  Chinese	  Studies.	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http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Formulation%20of%20Energy%20Policy%20in%2
0China.pdf.	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NDRC departments in particular are vital for this process: the Climate Change 
Department and the National Energy Administration.   
 Department of Climate Change, or 应对气候变化司, is a department within the 
NDRC instituted in 2008 and is entrusted with researching and analyzing the effects of 
climate change on national development, creating national climate change strategies and 
policies, as well as international climate change conventions.  Another primary role of 
this department is to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and the National Leading Group Dealing with Climate Change, 
Energy Conservation, and Emission Reduction (Climate Change LSG).24  These smaller 
organizations, though essential for the research and development of national climate 
change strategies, do not have the authority to create policy and thus must work in 
conjunction with the Department of Climate Change.   
 The National Energy Administration (NEA), otherwise known as the National 
Energy Board or 能源局, was established in 2008 as the supreme agency responsible for 
creating and regulating China’s energy policy, including regulations on coal, oil, natural 
gas, and renewable energy sources.  The NEA is also in charge of energy conservation, as 
well as international and inter-departmental cooperation.  Although the NEA has 
officially been independent from the NDRC since 2009, it shares a large proportion of its 
leadership and personnel with the NDRC and is therefore largely considered to be an 
extension of the NDRC.25  In fact, many of the powers necessary to regulate the energy 
sector effectively, such as the ability to establish electricity prices, remain in the hands of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  “Department	  of	  Climate	  Change,”	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  
China,	  http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfod/200812/t20081218_252201.html.	  
25	  Burke,	  Jansson,	  and	  Jiang.	  “Formulation	  of	  Energy	  Policy	  in	  China.”	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the NDRC, thus the authority of the NEA is limited and requires the cooperation of the 
NDRC.  Moreover, as a vice ministry, the NEA hold a relatively low position in the 
government and actually operates below the ministries, commissions, and state-owned 
companies whom it is intended to oversee, making coordination problematic.   
 Under the authority of the NDRC, the Climate Change Department and NEA lack 
the autonomy and power to make independent decisions.  This is extremely worrisome, 
especially considering the fact that the NDRC, the main ministry controlling coal policy, 
is primarily aimed at furthering economic development, and is consequently 
automatically biased on the question of coal use.  From this organizational system, it is 
therefore reasonable to assume that China’s coal policy is rooted in economic rather than 
environmental concerns.   
 The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), or 中华人民共和国环境保护
部，was founded in 2008 to replace the former State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA).  The official duties of the MEP are to regulate of water, air, soil, 
noise, radioactive, and solid waste pollution, as well as to formulate, implement, and 
enforce environmental protection policies and standards.  MEP is also responsible for the 
coordination of environmental policies among the various provinces and funding and 
organizing research and development in this field.  Due to its relatively new conception, 
the MEP is not yet well established and has a much smaller budget, administration, and 
clout in comparison to the NDRC.26  Therefore, although the MEP is the primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Ong,	  “The	  Apparent	  “Paradox”	  in	  China’s	  Climate	  Policies.”	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department focused on environmental protection, the NDRC creates the majority of 
environmental policies.   
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), or 中华人民共和国外交部, is the 
primary organization charged with constructing China’s international coal policy.  The 
MFA therefore is charged with representing China in international environmental 
negotiations and ensuring that the agreed upon regulations do not interfere with the 
country’s national coal policy.27   
 Three major problems exist in the organization of the government mechanisms 
intended to formulate China’s coal policy.  Firstly, as stated above, the NDRC, a ministry 
responsible for economic development, is the primary authority over both the energy and 
environmental sides of China’s coal policy.  Secondly, there is a large overlap of 
responsibilities between the ministries, thereby undermining the effectiveness of each 
agency and leaving it unclear which agency has the final authority.  For example, both 
the Department of Climate Change and the MEP are responsible for formulating 
environmental policies, including policies on coal use and air pollution.  Furthermore, 
every one of the organizations listed above is responsible for international cooperation.  
This disorganization has been visible in the international arena on several occasions, most 
notably at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) held in Copenhagen in 2009.  At 
this conference, the Chinese delegation seemed unclear on its own policies, holding up 
the meeting multiple times in order to call their superiors and ask questions.28   Thirdly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Ibid.	  	  
28	  Mark	  Lynas,	  “How	  Do	  I	  Know	  China	  Wrecked	  the	  Copenhagen	  Deal?	  I	  Was	  in	  the	  Room,”	  The	  Guardian,	  
December	  22,	  2009.	  http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-­‐climate-­‐
change-­‐mark-­‐lynas.	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although there do exist several small inter-departmental committees intended to promote 
cooperation between these groups, including the National Energy Commission and 
Climate Change LSG, true coordination is still lacking.29   
National Policy 
On a national level, China’s coal policy is fragmented and unorganized.  Aside 
from the Coal Law of 1996 (reformed in 2011), which focuses on the standardization of 
the coal industry, including exploration, production, and distribution, China does not 
have clear-cut coal policies or laws.30  Instead, these policies are buried within 
environment and energy policies.  After extracting the specific coal-oriented policies, it 
becomes clear that the country has no national standard for coal use, instead, the 
provinces are each expected to produce their own coal policies based on the guidelines 
set by environment and energy “plans” promulgated by the central government every few 
years.  At the provincial level, these policies are created by miniature versions of the 
national organizations outlined above.31  Although these plans are not technically laws, 
they are all reviewed and voted on by the State Council and can therefore be considered 
part of the country’s legislation.32  The most important of these plans to the current coal 
policy are the 12th Five Year Plan and the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ong,	  “The	  Apparent	  ‘Paradox’	  in	  China’s	  Climate	  Policies.”	  
30	  Xin	  Qiu	  and	  Honglin	  Li,	  “Energy	  regulation	  and	  legislation	  in	  China”	  Environmental	  Law	  Reporter	  
46(2012):	  10677-­‐10693.	  
31	  Philip	  Andrews-­‐Speed,	  The	  Governance	  of	  Energy	  in	  China:	  Transition	  to	  a	  Low-­‐Carbon	  Economy	  (New	  
York:	  Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2012).	  	  
32	  Ye	  Qi	  and	  Tong	  Wu,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Climate	  Change	  in	  China,”	  WIREs:	  Climate	  Change	  4(2013):	  301-­‐313.	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 China’s 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) was issued in March of 2011 and marks the 
primary policy governing the period of 2011 through 2015.  This FYP includes a specific 
section for the coal industry which aims to limit China’s national production and 
consumption to 3.9 billion tons.  This is not a dramatic target, as it still allows for an 
annual growth rate of 3.8, or an additional 860 million tons of new coal production 
capacity use.33 Aside from the coal industry section of the FYP, the general plan includes 
three main objectives which relate to the coal sector.  The first of these is an increase of 
non-fossil energy to 11.4 percent of total energy use, which would necessarily decrease 
the percentage of coal use, though the exact amount of decrease is uncertain and never 
estimated.  The second of the objectives is a 17 percent reduction of carbon intensity, or 
the carbon emissions released per unit of GDP, by the end of the five years.  The final 
objective is a reduction of carbon intensity by 40-45 percent compared to 2005 numbers 
by the year 2020.34  This goal has been stated on multiple occasions by the Chinese 
government since 2009, but was never officially put into writing until this FYP.35   
The Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control or 《大气污染防治行
动计划》, hereby referred to as the Action Plan, was released by China’s State Council 
in September of 2013.  This plan is unique in that it recognizes that coal consumption 
must be significantly reduced in order to control air pollution and subsequently is the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Kevin	  Jianjun	  Tu,	  “China’s	  Problematic	  Coal	  Plan,”	  The	  Diplomat,	  April	  18,	  2012,	  
http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/chinas-­‐problematic-­‐coal-­‐plan/.	  And	  “China’s	  Coal	  Imports	  Set	  to	  Hold	  
Steady	  in	  2014,”	  Reuters,	  April	  10,	  2014,	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/china-­‐coal-­‐
idUKL3N0N20GO20140410.	  
34	  “Guomin	  Jingji	  He	  Shehui	  Fazhan	  Di	  Shi’er	  Ge	  Wu	  Nian	  Guihua	  Gangyao	  [National	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Development	  Twelfth	  Five	  Year	  Plan],”中央政府	  (Central	  Government),	  March	  16,	  2011,	  
http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838_7.htm.	  
35	  Joanna	  Lewis,	  “Energy	  and	  Climate	  Goals	  of	  China’s	  12th	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,”	  	  Center	  for	  Climate	  and	  Energy	  
Solutions,	  March	  2011,	  http://www.c2es.org/international/key-­‐country-­‐policies/china/energy-­‐climate-­‐
goals-­‐twelfth-­‐five-­‐year-­‐plan.	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plan to introduce coal caps for individual provinces.36  Coal caps were introduced to nine 
provinces and municipalities.  Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and Shandong are to reduce coal 
consumption by 83 million tons in 2017 compared with 2012 levels, a decrease of around 
11% from 749 million tons in 2012 to 666 million tons.37  Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
and Guangdong are each to decrease coal consumption in 2017 from 2012 amounts, 
though it is unclear by exactly how much, and finally Liaoning is to ensure its coal 
consumption in the year 2017 does not exceed 200 million tons.38 Although Inner 
Mongolia and Shanxi have the second and third highest consumption rates after 
Shandong province, they and the rest of the provinces have yet to be required to 
implement specific caps on coal.  According to the government, the measures in these 
nine regions alone will reduce the total coal consumption by 426 million tons and carbon 
emissions by 605 million tons.39  The Action Plan states that by 2017, coal will reduce to 
65 percent of the country’s total energy use, allowing non-fossil energy consumption to 
rise to 13 percent.40  In the three key regions, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the Yellow River 
Delta, and the Pearl River Delta, the government plans to replace coal with natural gas 
and non-fossil fuel energy in order to attain reduce coal consumption.41  In regards to air 
pollution more generally, this plan stipulates that the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Shuo	  and	  Myllyvirta,	  “The	  End	  of	  China’s	  Coal	  Boom.”	  
37	  “Consumption	  of	  Coal	  in	  China	  in	  2012,	  by	  Region	  (in	  Million	  Tons),”	  Statista,	  2015.	  
38	  Qiang	  Liu,	  Chuan	  Tian,	  Zhuo	  Li,	  Hongxing	  Xie,	  Lijian	  Zhao,	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  Yuan	  Lin,	  Analysis	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Reduction	  Co-­‐Benefits	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  Policy	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  Action	  Plan	  (2013-­‐
2017),	  Beijing:	  Clean	  Air	  Alliance	  of	  China,	  2014.	  
39	  “The	  State	  Council	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  Plan	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  Control	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  Pollution	  Introducing	  Ten	  
Measures	  to	  Improve	  Air	  Quality,”	  Ministry	  of	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  Republic	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September	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  2013,	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  with	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  Clean	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  Asia,	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reduces its average PM2.5 concentration by 25 percent, the Yellow River Delta achieve 
up to a 20 percent reduction, and the Pearl River Delta by 15 percent, all by the year 2017.  
It also requires that all second and third tier cities reduce annual average PM10 
concentrations by 10 percent from 2012 levels by 2017.42	  	  In order to achieve these hefty 
goals, the Action Plan for Air Pollution Prevention and Control sets requirements for 
coal-fired burners, stipulating that no new coal-fired boilers are to be built which burn 
less than 20 tons of coal.  Moreover, existing boilers burning less than 10 tons of coal are 
to be gotten rid of.43   
Although the above-mentioned plans represent the main coal policies distributed 
to the public, they are very broad and fail to mention many of the intricacies of the actual 
policy.  Further information can be retrieved from subsections of other environmental and 
energy plans, as well as the official NEA, MEP, and Department of Climate Change 
websites and government news sources, all of which include updates and additional 
information on policies.  This information is obviously fragmented, but can be used to fill 
some of the gaps left by the 12th FYP and Action Plan, including data on coal imports and 
carbon emissions reduction measures, such as use of coal-fired boilers, gasification, and 
implementation of desulphurization technology.  For instance, article 23 of the 
Atmospheric Protection Law 《大气污染防治法》, enacted in 2000, states that the 
central government “promotes” the washing and upgrading of coal, reductions of the 
sulfur and ash content in coal, and restrictions on extracting coal with high sulfur and ash 
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content.  These actions would certainly lower emissions, however, the “promotion” of 
these activities in no way requires that they be undertaken, thus there remain no legal 
requirements to wash coal and no punishment for burning dirty, unwashed coal.44  
Similarly, article 1 of the 10 Atmospheric Protection Articles 《大气十条》published in 
2013 lists the overhaul of small-scale coal burners, acceleration of desulphurization, and 
reduction of nitrogen compounds and ash as major goals.  However, because the wording 
of the document is “acceleration of desulphurization,” and not simply “desulphurization,” 
factory owners can legally continue to release high quantities of Sulphur dioxide into the 
atmosphere as long as they have a plan to desulphurize their coal in the future.45 
The plans laid out in the 12th FYP, Action Plan, and official government websites 
seem lofty but in reality are extremely vague, with no specific goals.  They typically 
consist of elusive energy objectives, usually prescribing that the country decrease carbon 
emissions by a certain percentage compared to the emissions of a previous year.  
However, these objectives fail to clarify exactly how much of a decrease they wish to 
obtain or even the carbon emissions of the reference year, thus making it very difficult to 
decipher the country’s actual policy.  One key example of this can be found in The 
Action Plan of 2013, whereby the government proclaimed that all second and third tier 
cities will lower their PM10 concentration by 10 percent from 2012 figures without 
revealing what these figure are.   In actual fact, it is unlikely that even the Chinese 
government knows the PM10 concentrations from these cities, as many do not yet have 
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the means to accurately measure this number even today, much less in 2012.46  On this 
point it should be noted that one of the objectives of the Action Plan is to install proper 
mechanisms to measure PM10 and PM2.5 in all cities, thus the government should have 
this information in the future.  Of course, whether or not they will choose to release it is 
uncertain.  Another prime example of national plans leaving out reference numbers can 
be seen in the 12th Five Year Plan, which stated that the country plans to reduce the 
intensity of its carbon emissions by 40-45 percent by 2020 compared to 2005 emissions.  
This objective has been acclaimed throughout the international community for its high 
targets, however, the baseline emissions number has never been released by the Chinese 
government.  In fact, the only emissions numbers the general public is privy to from 2005 
are the estimates released by environmental organizations such as the Energy Information 
Agency and the Energy Research Institute, the majority of which are U.S.-based.47  
Although the numbers released by these organizations are likely relatively accurate, they 
are not necessarily the same as the official figures used by the Chinese government, 
therefore the public is unable to ascertain China’s precise goal or assess its success.   
Furthermore, the projected targets in this plan, like the majority of emissions targets 
released by the Chinese government, are intensity-based targets as opposed to absolute 
targets.  Intensity-based targets focus on greenhouse gas intensity, or the ratio of 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic activity, not the absolute amount of 
emissions.48  Essentially, this means that intensity-based emissions are decoupled from 
absolute emissions, hence, intensity-based emissions tell us very little about a country’s 
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absolute emissions.  Therefore, while its intensity-based emissions are decreasing, 
China’s total carbon emissions are actually still increasing due to the country’s continued 
economic growth.49   
 Although the central government asks provinces to reduce their emissions, they 
do not provide action plans for how they should do so, leaving policy formation to the 
discretion of each province.  This lack of uniformity has led to sizable discrepancies 
between each province in their coal policies.  We can get a sense of this discrepancy in 
the “Barometer of Completion of Energy-Saving Targets by Region from January to 
October of 2012” (个地区 2012年 1~10月节能目标完成情况晴雨表), released by the 
NDRC in 2012.  This chart measures the extent to which each province’s energy plan 
puts the province on track to meets the energy-saving targets set by the 12th FYP.  
According to the barometer, 19 provinces, including Beijing and Tianjin, complied with 
the 12th FYP, 3 provinces somewhat complied, and 8 provinces failed to comply, the 
worst offenders of which were Hainan and Xinjiang, which made no effort to comply 
over the ten months.50 The international narrative of the situation paints an even bleaker 
picture in relation to coal.  According to a Greenpeace study in 2014, only 12 of China’s 
34 administrative regions have agreed to implement coal control measures in any form 
and only half of these 12 provinces have included absolute coal consumption reduction 
goals in their provincial action plans.51 
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Figure 1.2: Map of China’s Coal Control Measures 
 
SOURCE:  Shuo, Li and Lauri Myllyvirta. “The End of China’s Coal Boom.” Greenpeace. April 11, 2014.  
 
Another reason for the vast discrepancy of policies between provinces is that, 
much like the “Reform and Opening Up” policy (改革开放), China’s coal policy plans to 
start on the east coast and gradually move westward.  For this reason, national policies 
are only strictly enforced in three regions: the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze 
River Delta, comprised of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, and the Pearl River Delta, 
located in Guangdong.  Meanwhile, western regions have significantly more leeway in 
their actions.  These three chosen regions are generally more populated, more highly 
polluted, and have higher GDPs than other parts of China, thus reducing pollution is a 
higher priority and more easily achieved.  This shift in coal concentration can be seen 
through the trend of investments into the coal industry from 2006 to 2011.  In the year 
2006, half of all investments (50.3 percent) in the coal industry, meaning funds directed 
towards constructing coal mines and producing technology for use in the coal industry, 
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were directed to the central region of the country, while 13 percent went to the eastern 
region and 37 percent into the western region.  In the years to follow, investments in the 
central and eastern regions decreased and the money moved instead to the western region.  
Within five years, the west took over as the primary destination for investments into coal 
mine technology and construction, while the investment to the east dropped to just over 7 
percent of total investment.52  An example of this east-focused strategy in official policy 
is the NEA’s policy announcement released in October of 2014, which provides a new 
policy for different regions of the country regarding the production of coal mines.  
According to the announcement, no more coal mining projects would be started in the 
eastern part of the country, in the middle region, including the northeast, will follow a 
“retire one, build one” (退一建一) policy, whereby coal production capacity is 
maintained, and the western region will continue to focus on building large coal bases 
and increasing production.53  Unfortunately, focusing coal reduction efforts in these three 
regions allows for carbon leakage, a trend whereby heavy industry prohibited or limited 
in one region moves to one with fewer limitations.54  Carbon leakage in China would 
mean that all of the coal and air pollution measures would ultimately have little to no 
effect, as the pollution would simply move to a different region.  Indeed, this trend is 
already visible; coal-fired power plants in Xinjiang are set to double by 2019, while all 
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coal-fired plants in the three key regions are being shut down or converted to 
accommodate other forms of power.55      
International Policy: 
China’s international coal and climate policies tell a similar story to its national 
policies; China has never signed an internationally-binding treaty to cut its greenhouse 
gas emissions or decrease coal use.  This is not to say that China is not involved in 
multilateral environmental negotiations; indeed, China is an active participant, having 
signed more than 20 international environmental treaties since first joining international 
negotiations in 1972.56  The most significant of these treaties is the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the accompanying Kyoto 
Protocol, which China ratified in 1992 and 2002 respectively.57  The Framework aims to 
“prevent dangerous human interaction with the climate system” by requiring countries to 
decrease their carbon emissions by different specified amounts.58  In signing the 
UNFCCC, China publicly announced that by the year 2020, it would “endeavor” to 
decrease its CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent as compared to 2005 levels, 
as well as increase the ratio of non-fossil fuels in its energy consumption by around 15 
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percent.59   However, the government made clear that these “endeavors” were voluntary 
and thus it could not be penalized for failing to meet them in their entirety.60  
On the surface, the ratification of the UNFCCC and other U.N. treaties on climate 
change seems to suggest that China is eager to limit its CO2 emissions and cooperate 
with the international community on the subject of climate change.  However, on closer 
inspection it is apparent that these treaties are more of a formality and do not necessarily 
translate into enforced change within the country.   The main reason for the inadequacy 
of international climate treaties in relation to China is undoubtedly the country’s label as 
a non-Annex I developing nation.  In these international treaties, countries are divided 
into two main groups: Annex I and non-Annex I countries.  Annex I includes wealthy 
industrialized nations which were members of the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) as well as countries with economies in transition (known 
as EITs), such as the Russian Federation and Baltic States.  Non-Annex I includes the 
remaining countries, all of which are considered developing nations.  These two groups 
are held to very different standards.  Under the UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 
nations are required to meet mandatory targets on greenhouse gas emissions and 
continuously submit reports detailing their progress.  The wealthiest of Annex I countries 
are also expected to provide money to developing countries to be used for the 
development of climate-friendly technology.  Non-Annex I nations, on the other hand, 
are not required to make legally binding commitments and are only made to submit very 
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general reports of their efforts if and when they receive funding.61  Therefore, due to 
China’s status as a developing country, it has no legal obligation to meet emission 
reduction targets, and is only “asked to voluntarily comply” with international 
standards.62   This status, then, explains the weak language on the part of the Chinese in 
the UNFCCC and all subsequent environmental treaties.  
China’s status as a developing nation has been strongly contested and eventually 
led to the refusal of the United States, Australia, and Canada to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
(though Australia ultimately ratified the Protocol in 2007).63  China holds that although it 
has the second largest GDP in the world, it is in fact only a developing country and 
should be regarded as such in all aspects of international relations.  The country draws 
their reasoning from an economic standpoint, citing the fact that one-sixth of the Chinese 
population, around 250 million people, live on less than two dollars a day.  Moreover, 
China has a per capita income of approximately 6,500 dollars, establishing it as an upper-
middle-income economy and still a developing nation, according to the criterion laid out 
by the World Bank.64  These facts of China’s economic condition cannot be contested, 
however, many countries, most notably the United States, have argued that China should 
be considered a special case in regards to climate change, as well as a string of other 
issues, and no longer be regarded as a non-Annex I developing nation.65  Much of their 
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argument refers to the fact that China produces more carbon dioxide emissions than the 
EU and US combined, at around 28 percent of total global emissions.  Even when taking 
China’s large size and population into account, the emissions of the country are still 
disproportionately high; China has higher per capita emissions than the entire European 
Union.66  The United States contends that as a main culprit of climate change, China 
should be legally required by the international community to meet defined goals in 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions.67  During the 2014 U.N. Climate Change 
Summit, President Obama publicly criticized China for not doing more to prevent climate 
change, stating that China and the United States “have the responsibility to lead [in these 
issues], that’s what big nations have to do” (Stone Fish, 2014).  China countered this 
remark and others like it by stating that climate change was caused by the US and 
developed nations, therefore they should be the ones to take the lead in reversing it.  This 
statement is on par with China’s international climate change policy, which since the 
1991 Beijing Ministerial Declaration on the Environment and Development has 
denounced external pressure aimed at limiting the country’s development.68 
It should be noted that during the 17th Conference of Parties, held in 2011, 
participating parties agreed that the follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, which is 
due to expire in 2017, should require all nations, not merely Annex-I nations, to meet 
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specific emission reduction targets.69   During this conference, China remarked for the 
first time that it would be willing to discuss a legally binding carbon emissions agreement 
after 2020 if other nations met five conditions.70  These conditions are that other parties: 
follow through with the Kyoto Protocol until 2017, review long-term goals, respect that 
fact that countries have different capacities to cut emissions and should therefore have 
different levels of responsibility, come to a consensus on multiple issues, including 
finance, transparency, and technology transfer, and finally that developed countries meet 
agreed financial commitments.71  This statement was largely considered to be an 
encouraging sign that China was now willing to become more involved in climate change 
control, however, much like the majority of the Chinese government’s statements 
regarding climate change, the language is too ambiguous to translate into real action.  For 
example, the demand that other nations agree that every country should have different 
amounts of responsibility based on their ability suggests that any legal agreement which 
might take place will be minimal.  
Most recently, in November of 2014, China made a climate deal with the U.S. in 
what was praised by the media as a “landmark” and “historic” agreement.  In the accord, 
both countries agreed to new carbon emission reduction targets.  The United States 
pledged to reduce its emissions by around 27 percent by 2025 as compared to 2005 
numbers, doubling the scheduled pace of reduction.  China agreed to reach peak carbon 
emissions by 2030 or sooner with a plan to increase its clean energy use up to 20 percent 
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of the country’s total energy production.72  This agreement made by China is indeed 
momentous, as it marks the first time that China has specifically stated a year for its peak 
coal consumption and that it plans to increase clean energy usage to such an extent.  
Unfortunately, this treaty, if it can be so-called, is not legally binding, nor may it even be 
upheld by the American side, where a Republican-led Senate is fighting every piece of 
climate change legislation which comes its way.  If not upheld by the US, the agreement 
would lose all sense of legitimacy and likely be thrown out by the Chinese.  Luckily, 
though, the current Chinese coal policy is well on track to achieve this goal, or one close 
to it, if implemented properly by all the provinces.  
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Chapter 2: Trends in Energy Use: 
The previous chapter has discussed China’s official coal policies and plans, but 
what does their actual consumption of coal look like?  The trend over the last decade in 
China has been increased annual coal consumption at a decreasing rate.  According to 
official figures, total coal used increased by more than 1 billion metric tons in the period 
from 2006 to 2013, from 2.5 to 3.7 billion tons.73  This increase alone is equal to the total 
coal consumption of Europe in 2012.74  However, because the rise took place at a 
decreasing rate, the majority of that upsurge took place before 2011.  After this year, 
growth dropped to under 3 percent.  This decrease could be due to a plethora of reasons, 
one being that the growth of the Chinese economy has slowed and thus needs less coal to 
sustain it.  A more optimistic explanation for this development is the new coal and 
environmental regulations under the 12th FYP, which was released in March of 2011. 
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  At the time of this article’s publication, the official data on 2014 coal consumption had 
not yet been released, as there exists a lag time; however, the estimates for 2014 are 
extremely promising.  According to a Greenpeace energy report, coal use in the first 
three-quarters of 2014 was 1 to 2 percent lower than the previous year.  This is significant 
for the country, which usually sees a 5 to 10 percent annual growth rate.75  If this report is 
accurate, China will have decreased or at least maintained its coal consumption for the 
first time in over 15 years.   Of course, this data has not yet been officially released and 
thus cannot be verified.  Moreover, if indeed China’s coal use remained stable during 
2014, this does not necessarily translate into a trend of decreased reliance on coal, as coal 
use fluctuates yearly.  More than likely, coal use in the country will continue to rise 
slowly for the foreseeable future.76  Only time will tell if this is an anomaly or the 
beginning of real change for the country.   
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Figure 2.1: Coal Consumption in China 
 
SOURCE: Chart made with information derived from China Energy Research Society (中国能源研究会).  
Zhongguo Nengyuan Fazhan Baogao (2013) [China Energy Development Report (2013)]. Beijing: Beijing 
University, 2013.and Tang, Danlu. “China’s Coal Consumption Growth Slows.” Xinhua. January 15, 2014.  
It is important to place coal use in the context of total energy use. According to 
official data, China consumed a whopping 2,852.4 Mtoe of energy in 2013.77  The vast 
majority of this energy, around 67 percent or 1,925.3 Mtoe, was derived from coal.  The 
second largest source of energy was oil, which provided 18 percent, or 507.4 Mtoe of the 
energy.  Hydroelectricity consumption accounted for 7 percent of total energy, at 206.3 
Mtoe.  Natural gas provided 145.5 Mtoe of energy, or 5 percent.  Other sources of energy 
were relatively insignificant; renewable energy, including wind and solar, accounted for 2 
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percent, or 42.9 Mtoe, and nuclear power comprised less than 1 percent of total energy, 
with a mere 25 Mtoe of energy.78   
Figure 2.2: China Energy Consumption by Type 2013 in Mtoe 
 
SOURCE: Chart made with data derived from“Primary Energy Consumption in China in 2010 to 2013, by 
Fuel Type (in Million Ton of Oil Equivalent).” Statista. 2014. 
 
Renewable Energy  
 Although China currently has a relatively small renewable energy sector, only 
accounting for 9 percent of the country’s total energy as of 2013, it is growing at a rapid 
pace.  The vast majority of this renewable energy, around 85 percent, comes from 
hydropower, followed by thermal, wind, and solar.79  In 2012, China’s clean energy 
investments totaled 67.76 billion US dollars, surpassing any other country and nearly 50 
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percent more than the next highest country, the United States.80  Current investment in 
the sector equals one-fifth of total global investment in renewables, significantly more 
than any other nation.81  From 2006 to 2020, China plans to invest around 210 billion 
USD into hydropower and 900 billion yuan into wind power.  It has also proposed a 
subsidy of 20,000 yuan/kilowatt (3,228 dollars/kilowatt) of solar energy.82  These 
investments have gone to good use; China doubled its solar capacity in 2013, installing 
12 gigawatts of solar panels, more than has ever been installed by a single country in a 
single year.83  Meanwhile, China’s wind energy sector is the fastest growing in the 
world.84  The country has also now installed more wind energy capacity than anywhere 
else; 20.7 gigawatts as compared to the 4.7 of the United States.85  However, though 
China has more installed turbines, the technology has proved to be less efficient than that 
of other countries.  Although the technology in the U.S. only represents a quarter of that 
in China, it produces 20 percent more energy.86  Besides problems in efficiency, the 
country also has problems promoting the use of renewable energy.  Grid companies are 
reluctant to adopt other energy sources besides coal, especially renewable sources, as 
they are much more expensive than the cheap substance.  Because the electricity prices 
paid by the public are fixed by the government, grid companies must absorb the added 
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costs associated with renewables themselves.87  In an attempt to counteract this, the 
national government has provides financial incentives for grid companies to connect to 
renewable energy sources and fines for those who do not.88  For example, in 2014 power 
plants generating solar power were allotted feed-in tariffs between 0.9 and 1 yuan per 
kilo-watt hour (kWh) of energy produced, while those generating wind power were 
allotted around 0.5 yuan per kWh.89,90  Unfortunately, even with these feed-in tariffs and 
fines, it is still more cost effective for these companies to use fossil fuels, thus the 
renewable energy sector has yet to gain a significant hold in the market.   
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Chapter 3: Economic Objectives 
 So far, this paper has discussed China’s policies regarding coal.  The remainder of 
the text will serve to discuss the reasoning behind this policy.  There are three main 
factors which influence and shape China’s coal policy; these are economic, 
environmental, and social.  
Price Comparison  
Almost every source discussing coal in China cites its relatively low price as one 
of the main reasons for its continued use, but exactly how cheap is coal in relation to 
other energy sources?  This section will discuss and compare the energy prices of coal, 
oil, natural gas, and various non-fossil fuel sources.  The most recent prices available for 
the majority of the energy types are from the year 2012, thus these statistics will be used.   
  In China, coal is priced according to kilocalorie count.  The three main units are 
5500, 5000, and 4500 kilocalorie coal.  Coal with around 5500 kilocalories is classified 
as thermal coal, otherwise known as steam coal.  This type is primarily used for power 
generation, its primary function, accounting for roughly 50 percent of usage.  In 2012, the 
cost of thermal coal ranged in price from 630 to 785 yuan per metric ton throughout the 
year, averaging out at 670 yuan.91  5000 kilocalorie coal, classified by the government as 
metallurgical coal, ranged from 530 to 685 yuan per metric ton, having an average cost of 
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607 yuan.92 Coal with a kilocalorie count of 4500, otherwise known as coking coal, is 
mainly used in the production of iron and steel, an industry which is responsible for 
around 37 percent of total domestic coal usage.  The price of this type of coal fluctuated 
though the year from 435 to 585 yuan per metric ton, averaging out at 508 yuan per 
metric ton.93  
 Oil prices in China do not necessarily coincide with global market prices, but are 
rather regulated by the NDRC.  Prices differ based not only on the type of oil, but also 
what industry it is to be used for.  For example, the military and industries promoted by 
the government often get a discounted price while less strategic industries pay more94.  
The only concrete numbers readily available by the NDRC for the year 2012 are those for 
military use, therefore, military prices will be used in this study.  For that reason, it is 
important to note that the average oil prices across all sectors may be slightly higher.  The 
prices are as follows: gasoline was 8580 yuan per metric ton, diesel was 7730 per metric 
ton, and kerosene was 7770 yuan per metric ton.95   
 The price of natural gas in China varies based not only on its purpose, but also on 
the city in which it is sold, according to each city gate price.  There are four categories for 
natural gas use which determine its cost: residential use, industry and commerce, 
electricity generation, and use by automobiles.  Each local government decides the prices 
for each of these sectors based on their needs and policy goals, therefore one sector may 
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have the cheapest natural gas in one city and the most expensive natural gas in another.  
Using the median prices from Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Urumqi, and Chengdu, cities 
which span across the country, we can get a good indication of the average price of 
natural gas in each of the four sectors.  Based on this theory, the average price of natural 
gas in 2012 was 2.24 yuan per cubic meter for residential use; 2.69 yuan per cubic meter 
for the industry and commerce sector; 2.14 yuan for the generation of electricity; and 
3.85 yuan per cubic meter for automobile use.96  As coal is not used to power 
automobiles, natural gas for this purpose cannot be equated to coal and thus will not be 
included in the final calculations.   
Table 3.1: Natural Gas Prices in China 
CITY RESIDENTIAL 
USE 
INDUSTRY 
AND 
COMMERCE 
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION 
AUTOMOBILE 
USE 
BEIJING 2.28  ¥/m3 2.84 ¥/m3 2.28 ¥/m3 4.73 ¥/m3 
NANJING 2.2 ¥/m3 2.95 ¥/m3 2.099 ¥/m3 4.6 ¥/m3 
GUANGZHOU 3.45 ¥/m3 3.7 ¥/m3 1.610 - 2.4 ¥/m3 ------- 
URUMQI 1.37 ¥/m3 1.76 ¥/m3 2.11 ¥/m3 2.08 ¥/m3 
CHENGDU 1.89 ¥/m3 2.2 ¥/m3 2.2 ¥/m3 4 ¥/m3 
SOURCE: China Energy Research Society (中国能源研究会).  Zhongguo Nengyuan Fazhan Baogao 
(2013) [China Energy Development Report (2013)]. Beijing: Beijing University, 2013. 
 
 There are five primary types of non-fossil fuel energy used in China: hydraulic, 
wind, nuclear, and solar.  Although hydraulic power represents the largest renewable 
energy sector, accounting for 22 percent of China’s power generation in 2012, exact 
prices are unavailable for the energy source.  However, the prices of the other non-fossil 
fuels are available.  In 2012, wind power cost 0.55 yuan per kilowatt hour (kWh), nuclear 
power was 0.50 yuan per kWh, and solar power was the most expensive at 1.09 yuan per 
kWh.97  Though at first glance these energy sources seem much cheaper than fossil fuels, 
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one must keep in mind that one kilowatt hour is relatively small and contains much less 
energy than the measurements used for fossil fuels, specifically the metric ton and cubic 
meter.  In fact, as is usually the case, renewable and non-fossil fuel energy in China is 
considerably more expensive than other energy types.  
The prices stated above cannot provide a clear indication of the true price of each 
energy type, as they fail to factor in how much of each source is needed to provide the 
same amount of energy.  Each energy source is priced in a different way, making them 
difficult to compare.  For example, coal and oil are usually priced per metric ton, natural 
gas per cubic meter, and electricity, including that derived from renewable resources, per 
kilowatt hour.  Therefore, in order to get a good indication of the true cost of each energy 
source in relation to each other, each measurement must first be converted into a unit 
which can be more easily comparable.  This study will use British thermal units (Btu) for 
this purpose.  One Btu of energy is approximately equivalent to 1055 joules, or the 
amount of energy needed to heat one pound of water by one degree Fahrenheit.98  One 
metric ton of coal includes anywhere from 24 to 28 million Btu depending on the 
hardness of the coal (hard coal being more energy-rich).  Oil also ranges in Btu content 
based on type: one metric ton of gasoline is equal to around 38 million Btu, one ton of 
diesel has 43 million Btu, and one ton of kerosene includes 42 million Btu.  One cubic 
meter of natural gas is approximately equal to 36 thousand Btu, while one kilowatt hour 
of renewable energy is only equal to around 3,400 Btu.99   
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Once the energy sources are all priced by the same measurement unit, they are 
readily comparable.  Due to the fact that the original measurements all include high 
counts of Btu, prices are compared per million Btu.  The results of these calculations can 
be viewed in the chart below.  When viewing the chart, it is important to keep in mind 
that the final prices are estimates and may vary slightly depending on different 
conversion rates.   
Table 3.2: Price Comparison of Energy Sources in China, 2012 
ENERGY SOURCE PRICE 
(RMB) 
ENERGY 
( MILLION 
BTU) 
RMB PER 
MILLION 
BTU  
COAL THERMAL ¥670 per 
metric ton 
26 per metric 
ton 
¥25.33 
METALLURGICAL ¥607 per 
metric ton 
29 per metric 
ton 
¥21.18 
COKING ¥508 per 
metric ton 
31 per metric 
ton 
¥16.46 
OIL GASOLINE ¥8580 per 
metric ton 
38 per metric 
ton 
¥222.87 
DIESEL ¥7730 per 
metric ton 
43 per metric 
ton 
¥180.96 
KEROSENE ¥7770 per 
metric ton 
42 per metric 
ton 
¥186.88 
 NATURAL 
GAS 
INDUSTRY AND 
COMMERCE 
¥2.69 per m3 0.036 per m3 ¥74.72 
ELECTRICITY ¥2.14 per m3 0.036 per m3 ¥59.44 
RESIDENTIAL ¥2.24 per m3 0.036 per m3 ¥62.17 
NON-FOSSIL  WIND ¥0.55 per 
kWh 
0.0034 per 
kWh 
¥161.20 
NUCLEAR ¥0.50 per 
kWh 
0.0034 per 
kWh 
¥146.54 
SOLAR ¥1.09 per 
kWh 
0.0034 per 
kWh 
¥319.46 
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on numbers derived from China Energy Research Society (中国能
源研究会). Zhongguo Nengyuan Fazhan Baogao (2013) [China Energy Development Report (2013)]. 
Beijing: Beijing University, 2013. And “Chengpin You Gongying Jiage Tiaozheng Biao [Price Adjustment 
of Supplied Refined Oil Table].” National Development and Reform Commission (中华人民共和国国家
发展和改革委员会). 
 
The calculations found that all three types of coal; thermal, metallurgical, and 
coking, averaged out to around 20.99 yuan per million Btu.  The prices of the three oil 
types, gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, averaged 196.90 yuan per million Btu, though 
gasoline was considerably more expensive.  The median price for natural gas for industry 
and commerce, electricity, and residential use was 65.44 yuan per million Btu.  Finally, 
the average price of non-fossil fuels was 209.07 yuan per million Btu, solar power being 
the most expensive by a substantial amount.  More detailed findings of exact prices can 
be viewed in the chart above.  As evidenced by the chart, coal is by far the cheapest 
energy source, with the lowest price per Btu.  On average, coal is around 3 times cheaper 
than natural gas, 9 times cheaper than oil, and 10 times cheaper than renewable energy 
sources.  Due to these vast differences in price, it makes clear economic sense for China 
to continue in its heavy coal use.       
Economic Reliance at the Provincial Level 
 It is not only the national economy which relies on coal, but also many provincial 
economies.  Coal production encompass a large part of many local economies, especially 
that of Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, and Ningxia, which together hold 76 
percent of China’s coal reserves.100  These provinces are particularly effected by plans to 
reduce coal use.  Not only are they likely, and in many cases have already begun to suffer 
economic downturns from decreased demand of coal, but the estimated 5 million coal 
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workers located in these regions are at risk of losing their livelihood, adding to the 
economic burden of these provinces.101  For these reasons, it makes economic sense for 
these five regions to continue coal extraction and use.  These provinces, worried for their 
stability, are pushing for continued coal use.  
Worst effected by plans to reduce coal use is the province of Shanxi, which 
contains approximately one-third of China’s high-quality coal deposits.  The coal 
industry truly drives the local economy, which acquires approximately half of its GDP 
and 40 percent of its tax revenue from coal production. 102  This revenue has already 
witnessed a substantial decline; in the first six months of 2013, when national coal 
consumption slowed, tax revenue in the province from the coal industry decreased by a 
massive 9.85 billion yuan, from 34.01 billion yuan in the first half of 2012 to 24.16 
billion yuan.103  Moreover, Shanxi employs the highest percentage of coal workers in the 
nation; 20 out of every 100 people are engaged in the industry, five times the national 
average (as compared to the country’s average of 4 out of every 100).104  If these people 
were to lose their jobs, the region would face potential social instability.   
In an attempt to combat the effects of a slumping coal market, the Shanxi 
government introduced a stimulus package in 2013 in the form of 20 measures designed 
to revive the industry.  These measures include requiring officials to endorse and promote 
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the local coal industry to banks and financial institutions, as well as to the central 
government.105   Since the introduction of this measure and the increased endorsement of 
the local industry, at least one of China’s top five state-owned electricity utility 
enterprises has agreed to work with Shanxi’s coal companies.  The package also included 
a temporary suspension of environmental and coal mining taxes (discussed in more detail 
further on).  Though this suspension only lasted a few months, it is estimated to have cut 
production costs by 15 RMB per ton and increase profits by 900 million RMB.106  
Although potentially life-saving for Shanxi’s coal industry and its economy, the stimulus 
package could delay plans to reduce emissions and combat the pollution which is already 
plaguing the province.  If the central government wishes to maintain a “harmonious 
society,” as called for by Hu Jintao, who placed “building a harmonious society” at the 
top of government agenda in 2007,107 it must factor in the needs of these coal-producing 
provinces and their determination to save the coal industry at all costs.  
Coal Use at the Industrial Level 
 Another reason that coal is not easy to simply eliminate is the fact that it is 
required by industries such as iron and steel manufacturing.  China currently produces 45 
percent of the world’s iron and steel, significantly more than any other country.108  
Though the iron and steel industries are important to the country’s economy, accounting 
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for 7.42% and 8.19% of the country’s GDP respectively and the second and third largest 
industries in 2010, they come with a heavy environmental cost.109  Coking coal is used in 
the process of producing both iron and steel, as the carbon from coal is necessary to drive 
the production process.  Although there are now promising new methods of creating iron 
using electricity and natural gas, these methods have not yet been perfected and thus 
cannot be implemented on a large-scale.  As for steel, new production techniques have 
yet to be discovered, thus the process will likely continue to require large amounts of 
coking coal in the foreseeable future.110  One ton of steel requires 600 kilograms of coal 
and releases 1.53 kilograms of sulfur dioxide and 1 kilogram of smoke and soot into the 
atmosphere.111   Due to the fact that these industries are so vital to the economy, bringing 
in trillions of RMB in revenue and creating 100,000 jobs in Hebei alone, they have 
traditionally been allowed more leeway in implementation of environmental measures.  
Environmental policies almost always distinguish the iron and steel industries, stating 
that they have more time to enact measures than other sectors.112  Moreover, few of these 
measures and regulation are actually enforced.  According to chief of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, Yuehui Xiong, over 60 percent of steel firms have not 
completed the approval process and are completely unlicensed.  These firms know that 
they have little chance of getting government approval and so just go ahead with their 
operations, knowing that there will be little to no repercussions.113  Often, local 
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governments do no more than send warning letters; though they have the authority to shut 
down these businesses, they do not have the will or the power to do so.114  
Though the iron and steel industries are dirty and corrupt, there is hope that the 
Chinese economy will be moving away from this and other high-polluting industries and 
towards more clean industries.  In its 12th Five Year Plan, the county outlined seven 
“strategic emerging industries” which it plans to focus on in the coming years.  These are: 
energy efficient and environmental technologies, next generation information technology, 
biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials, and new-
energy vehicles.115  This restructuring of the economy, if implemented, would 
undoubtedly ease China’s reliance on coal.    
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Chapter 4: Environmental Objectives 
Coal Tax 
In order to curtail reliance on coal, the central government implemented an 
environmental tax on the coal industry beginning in January of 2015.  This tax on coal 
production varies in amount among different provinces.  The majority of provinces have 
a tax rate between 2 and 3 percent per ton produced, however, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, 
Ningxia, and Shaanxi, the country’s top producing provinces, have higher rates of 8, 9, 
6.5, and 6.1 percent respectively.116  Across the country, these rates translate into around 
30-50 RMB per metric ton.  The tax for consumption of coal is much lower, a mere 5 
RMB per ton for discharging pollutants, less than one US dollar.  Though these taxes are 
a step in the right direction, neither of them fully reflect the hidden external costs of 
production and consumption, including damages on the environment and human health.  
According to the study, “The True Cost of Coal” (煤炭的真实成本), by researchers at 
Tsinghua University, the true cost of coal is approximately 260 RMB per ton of coal.  
These costs include land, air, and water pollution, damage to wildlife as well as human 
health, and greenhouse gas emissions contributing to global warming.  The coal 
extraction and cleaning process alone discharges an average of around 737 million tons 
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of polluted water each year.117  64 percent of this estimated cost, or 166 RMB per ton, 
originates from the consumption, not production, of coal, meaning that the current 
consumption tax only represents 3 percent of the action costs of consumption.118  Burning 
just 1 ton of coal emits 1.53 kg of sulfur dioxide (SO2), 2 kg of carbon monoxide (CO), 
3-9 kg of nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and 9-11 kg of soot into the atmosphere.119  Besides 
these toxins, coal combustion also releases other pollutants including nitric oxide (NO), 
ozone (O3), and suspended particulates.  In fact, combustion of the energy accounts for 
75 percent of SO2 emissions, 85 percent of NO2 emissions, 60 percent of NO emissions, 
and 70 percent of suspended particulate emissions in the country.120  Though the 
production tax is much higher, the highest tax rates throughout the country still only 
account for around half of the costs of production, which is estimated to be around 94 
RMB per ton of coal.121  Assuming that these figures are correct, the current 
environmental tax is only around 20 percent of the actual damage associated with 
producing and burning coal.  These tax rates grossly underestimate the true cost of coal 
and must be increased significantly in order to balance out the environmental costs.  
Though these tax rates are low and only very recently introduced, there is hope that they 
will contribute to the reduction of both coal extraction and use.   
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Political Incentives 
Politically, public officials have little incentive to push for environmental 
protection over economic growth.  This is in large part due to the system used to promote 
leading officials, known as the cadre evaluation system (干部考核制度) (CES).  Under 
the CES, top officials evaluate the person directly below them in a one-level down 
system.  The main criteria for this evaluation is how well the administrator has worked 
towards the goals laid out by the Five Year Plan as well as the Government Work Report 
(GWR), a document published annually by the central and local governments which lays 
out the five core goals for that year.122  Though all GWRs should follow the example of 
the central government, each province is responsible for their own document, thus the 
goals and achievements of each province are slightly different.  Officials must do well in 
this evaluation in order to receive raises or promotions.  It is therefore in their best 
interest to follow the GWR to the best of their ability.   
Traditionally, the cadre evaluation system has been geared towards economic 
growth.  Officials were assessed solely on their ability to boost the economy and raise 
GDP and only those that did so were promoted.  This system, though good for the 
economy, permitted and in a sense encouraged the degradation of the environment, as 
economic growth can most quickly be achieved by using cheap fuel sources such as coal 
and leaving waste and pollution untreated.  This began to shift in 2006 with the 
implementation of the 11th FYP, which set four “binding” environmental targets, meaning 
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that they had the “effect of law” and would be included in CES evaluations.123  Although 
the 11th Five Year Plan placed a higher emphasis on the environment than those before it, 
the GWR of that time continued to minimize environmental issues, allowing officials to 
more easily overlook environmental goals.  It was not until 2014, under the leadership of 
Xi Jinping, that the focus of the GWR began to shift away from economic growth and 
towards social stability.  Administrators are now judged by their achievements in a more 
diverse set of areas, one being environmental protection.124  
By examining the central Government Work Report more closely, we can clearly 
see a slow transition away from an economic focus.   In 2011, the five national goals laid 
out by the central government in the GWR by order of importance were: fiscal and 
monetary policy; economic restructuring; social services and development; improving 
people’s well-being and social justice; and deepening reform and opening up.125  The first 
three of these goals are related to economic development and only under the fourth 
category, “improving people’s well-being and social justice,” was environmental 
protection discussed.  From this document, it is evident that the government was more 
concerned with boosting the economy than preserving the environment.  The first GWR 
after Xi Jinping’s reform shows that the government’s goals have shifted somewhat.  The 
five priorities outlined under the 2014 GWR are: deepening reform and opening up and 
stimulate market activity; innovate ideas and methods of macro-control to ensure that the 
economy is in a reasonable range; economic restructuring; protect and improve people’s 
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livelihood and promote social equity and justice; and finally to maintain social harmony 
and stability.  Much like the report from 2011, the 2014 report emphasizes the economy 
in its first three goals, indicating that the economy is still the primary focus.  However, 
unlike the preceding GWRs, other factors, including environmental, are discussed under 
both the fourth and fifth goals of “improving people’s livelihood” and “maintaining 
social harmony.”126  This increased mention indeed represents a gradual shift towards 
social and environmental goals, however, its main focus still seems to be economic 
growth.   
Although at a national level, the GWR indicates increased emphasis on 
environmental protection, provincial GWRs vary substantially from province to province.  
For this reason, provincial leaders have different levels of incentives for pushing green 
policies.  For example, some provinces, such as Eastern Shandong and Hebei, have 
incorporated air quality into their criteria for evaluation.127  Most provincial GWRs and 
FYPs continue to emphasize high economic growth.  The 12th FYP for 26 out of the 31 
provinces set economic growth rate targets around 12-17 percent, much higher than the 
national target of 7 percent.128  Considering the fact that ability to meet FYP targets is a 
factor in evaluation, it is apparent that provincial governments set many of their own 
priorities for promotion and are able to undermine national policies.   
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This system still has a ways to go to promote environmental protection.  Until 
environmental protection becomes a main goal of both the central and provincial 
governments and public officials are judged based on their ability to comply with this 
goal, they will have little incentive to promote environmental safety over economic 
growth.  However, on this point it should be noted that if a policy or project is good for 
both the environment and economy it is more likely to be approved. 
Although public officials have had little political incentive to protect the 
environment, one must keep in mind that they still have the same incentive as the 
common people to do so.  They are just as, if not more, aware as the public of the health 
risks associated with air and other forms of pollution.  Though Chinese government 
workers may be better off financially than the general populace and thus more able to 
avoid pollution through the use of air-filtering systems and face masks, they are not 
immune to it.  Pollution influences the lives of the officials in the same way that it does 
the common people, affecting their health and general wellbeing.  For this reason, there is 
hope that Chinese officials will be able to look past promotional opportunity and 
implement policies which prioritize environmental protection.  
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Chapter 5: Social Pressure 
 Another key factor influencing China’s coal policy is social pressure. A major 
reason that China has been able to sustain heavy coal use is that its people have been 
content with such a policy.  For the last century or so, citizens have mostly accepted an 
opportunity cost of environmental degradation because industrialization was seen as the 
best means of modernizing and creating national strength.129  In the 1980s, there were 
around 3,700 factories in Beijing, none of which had any environmental regulations 
which might hinder economic growth.  Far from causing public discontent, the people 
viewed the smokestacks as a sign of progress.130  During the reform era, as long as their 
socioeconomic status kept improving, they were satisfied with accepting harm to the 
environment as an inevitable side effect of the economic growth which they so craved.  
As people’s standard of living rises, however, their priorities have begun to shift away 
from economic gain and towards their broader wellbeing, something which is threatened 
by pollution and its associated health risks.  This is a universal trend which can be seen in 
other countries in their developmental stages, such as England in the 1950’s131 and Japan 
in the 1970’s.132   
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Aside from economic reasons, the Chinese public rarely complained about the 
pollution surrounding them simply because they were unaware that it was there or 
causing any serious effects.  Although similar levels of PM2.5 have existed in the country 
for decades and have actually decreased slightly since the 1990s, the public believed that 
what they were seeing was simply bad weather and not pollution.  This is because, before 
about seven years ago, the media referred to haze as “fog” in all published articles.133  
The first mention of 雾霾, the Chinese word for haze, in The China Daily was in August 
2008, in an article entitled, “Good air quality in Beijing Olympic Games progressing 
smoothly.”134  The word for air pollution, 空气污染, was first mentioned by the 
newspaper just a year earlier in August of 2007.135  For this reason, though citizens saw 
days of low visibility before this time, they were not aware that there was anything to be 
worried about.  In fact, before the Measures on Open Environmental Information were 
first enacted in May of 2008,136 any information on pollution, especially in regards to its 
harm to human health, was considered “internal information” and not released to the 
public.137  Therefore, the public had little to no idea that they had any reason to demand 
environmental protection.   
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Much like Britain and the Great Smog in 1952.138 China has also experienced 
phases of great pollution which have shocked the people and helped awaken their 
feelings of environmental protection.  Two main incidences in China have undoubtedly 
been vital to influencing public opinion concerning air pollution.  The first of these took 
place in October of 2011, when an episode of especially bad air pollution continued for 
weeks on end.  The vast discrepancy between the PM2.5 measurements recorded by the 
US Embassy in Beijing and the official air quality index of the Chinese government 
caused web users to openly question official air quality data for the first time.  Social 
pressure prompted the government to agree to publish official measurements of PM2.5 
and enact air pollution reduction targets for all major cities.139  The second incident 
occurred two years later in January of 2013, when noxious haze enveloped around 1.4 
million square kilometers, or one-seventh, of the country.  Though Beijing was worst 
effected, the haze was also visible over parts of 25 other provinces, including Hebei, 
Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shaanxi, and Sichuan.  Two days after the smog first 
appeared on January 10th, official PM2.5 levels surpassed 700 microns per cubic meter, 
while PM10 levels reached 993 microns per cubic meter, the highest concentration ever 
recorded and over 40 times what is considered safe by the World Health Organization.140  
This incident, dubbed the “airpocalypse,” lasted for almost two months and affected 
around 600 million people, approximately double the entire population of the United 
States.141  During that January, 27 cities around the country showed an increase in 
emergency room visits of 10-150 percent, mostly among small children and the elderly, 
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the age groups most susceptible to the effects of pollution.142 The result was an outcry by 
both the media and public to limit coal use and implement green policies.  In September 
of 2013, these cries were answered with the publication of the Action Plan on Prevention 
and Control of Air Pollution by the State Council in which provinces were instructed to 
introduce further measures to curb air pollution.143 
 Although the shift in public attitudes towards environmental degradation was 
slow to start, it is now moving at a rapid pace.  According to a study published by the 
Pew Research Center in 2013, 36 percent of the Chinese population viewed air pollution 
as a “very big problem” in 2012.  Just one year later, this number rose to 47 percent.144   
This contrasts starkly with a similar poll published by the World Values Survey in 2007, 
in which the majority of participants (1315 people or 66.1 percent) stated that poor air 
quality was “not very serious” or “not serious at all” only 13.2% of participants felt that 
poor quality was “very serious.”145  This comparison of years before and after the 
Measures on Open Environmental Information were implemented suggests that the open 
dialogue surrounding air pollution had a significant effect on public views on the topic.  
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Table 5.1: Environmental Problems in Your Community: Poor Air Quality (2007) 
 Number of cases %/Total 
Very serious 262 13.2% 
Somewhat serious 344 17.3% 
Not very serious 635 31.9% 
Not serious at all 680 34.2% 
No answer 2 0.1% 
Don´t know 67 3.4% 
(N) (1,991) 100% 
SOURCE: “Environmental Problems in Your Community: Poor Air Quality,” World Values Survey. 
Though this study clearly shows that environmental concerns are on the rise, the 
question still remains: what is more important to the Chinese- economic growth or 
environmental protection?  A survey conducted by the World Values Survey has asked 
the Chinese public this very question every four years for the past 16 years.  According to 
this survey, the public has valued environmental protection above the economy at least as 
far back as 1994, far before the topic was widely discussed in the media.  Though this is 
the case, there has been a steady rise in the percentage of people choosing the 
environment over the economy, from 51 percent in the 1994-1998 period to 57 percent in 
2010-2014.146  This is to be expected due to the worsening of the situation as well as the 
increase in availability of information.  Surprisingly, the percentage of people valuing the 
economy over environmental protection has also increased during this time, from 24 
percent to 28 percent.147  Though unexpected, this trend may be explained by the 
decrease in people choosing “other answer,” “no answer,” or “don’t know,” which has a 
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whole decreased from 24 percent to 15 percent in the last 16 years.148  The fact that these 
categories have reduced over time suggests that as the people have become more 
educated about environmental issues, they have developed stronger opinions on the topic.   
 
Figure 5.1: Protecting Environment vs. Economic Growth 
 
SOURCE: “Protecting Environment vs. Economic Growth,” World Values Survey 
 
Aside from pollution in their home country, research shows that the Chinese are 
also becoming more concerned about global warming and the greenhouse gas effect 
around the world, two factors which are directly related to coal use.  According to a 2007 
poll by World Values Survey, the majority of the survey population (690 people or 34.7 
percent) did not know whether or not global warming or the greenhouse effect were 
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serious problems.149  However, it should be noted that the second highest percentage, 
29.7 percent, felt that global warming or the greenhouse gas effect were somewhat 
serious.150  A survey released by the Pew Research Center six years later in 2013 shows 
that 39 percent of participants now felt that global warming is a “major threat” and only 
11 percent did not know or refused to answer the question.  Due to the fact that the 
questions asked in the two surveys are worded differently, I am unable to make one 
comparable graph to display the two responses.  Nevertheless, it is apparent from these 
numbers that more people in China are now educated on the topic of global warming and 
concerned by its effects around the globe.  Assuming that the results from the three 
questions discussed above are correct, it is safe to assume that the Chinese public are not 
only concerned about environmental protection, but also with China’s coal use, which is 
the cause of a large percentage of the country’s, and the worlds, air pollution.   
The Chinese public has also become more active in voicing its newfound opinions 
on these topics.   Unlike many other subjects in the strictly-regulated society, 
environmental concerns are not considered a political issue and thus can be openly 
discussed and even protested by the public without fear of retribution.151  For this reason, 
Chinese people are more likely to speak out, or attempt to speak out, against environment 
issues.  The number of letters and formal complaints submitted to the government about 
environmental concerns is on the rise.  In 1997, 100,000 such letters were submitted to 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (at that time the State Environmental Protection 
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Administration), in 2006 the number had risen to more than 600,000.152  In 2014, the 
Beijing Municipal Bureau of Environmental Protection received 12,599 formal smog 
complaints between January and May alone, 124 percent more than the previous year.153  
The only interruption in this upward trend occurred in 2007, when almost no formal 
complaints were submitted.  This dip is likely due to the immense environmental efforts 
by both the central and local governments in that year in preparation for the 2008 
Olympic Games, including the first national plan addressing climate change. 154 
As visible from the chart below, almost no public protests or complaints occurred 
between the years 2000 and 2008, when China’s economy boomed.  It can be discerned 
that the reason for the sudden change after 2008 occurred not only because of more 
accessible information after that time, but also because of the slowed economy growth 
rate from 14.2% the previous year to 9.6%.155   Whatever the case, after 2008, the number 
of complaints skyrocketed.  Environmental protests have also increased drastically, by a 
rate of around 30 percent annually since 1996.156  Though not all environmental 
grievances are about coal use, around 70 percent of environment-related complaints in 
Beijing are associated with air pollution, 90 percent of which is directly linked to coal.157  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a decrease in coal use or an increase in responsible 
coal use would lead to a significant decrease in environmental protests.  
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Figure 5.2: Environmental Petitions and Public Demonstrations China (1987-
2012) 
 
SOURCE: Kenji,	  Someno.	  “Breathing	  the	  Same	  Air:	  Outlook	  for	  Environmental	  Change	  in	  China.”	  The	  	  
Tokyo	  Foundation.	  February	  5,	  2014.	  
 
Although the government allows the public to openly express environmental 
concerns, large-scale protests are considered a threat to the social harmony which the 
country strives to maintain.  In line with its typical policy of 维稳, or maintaining social 
stability at all costs, the central government has generally refused to acknowledge these 
protests or petitions.158  Rather, it has worked quietly behind the scenes to limit and quiet 
public demonstrations and avert attention away from the incidents that do occur.  For 
example, in 2012 when the citizens of Chengdu organized a protest against a new 
paraxylene (PX) plant, the government mandated that the Saturday of the proposed 
protest be a work day.  Those who did not show up for work had their pay docked.  To 
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ensure that no one challenged their orders, the local military occupied the square where 
the demonstration was to be held, insisting that they were performing a scheduled drill.  
Any mention of the factory or PX and its effects on the environment or human body was 
blocked on the internet.  Unsurprisingly, far from distracting the public, the government’s 
silence towards the situation and others like it has incited public outrage.159   
Though the government has a history of ignoring environmental protests, that is 
not to say that they are unsuccessful.  Many such protests have led to increased fines for 
polluters and, in some cases, the complete removal and relocation of factories.  One such 
famous incident was the Dalian Protests in 2011 against the construction of a chemical 
plant which would have produced PX.  After days of large scale protests, the government 
stopped construction and relocated the factory to a new location far outside of the city 
limits.160  These same protest tactics were successful in blocking two subsequent PX 
projects in Ningbo and Kunming.  
The increased number of environmental complaints and protests has had a visible 
effect on governmental policy.  As of 2014, social harmony and stability now constitute 
two of the five primary goals of the country, as stated by the Central Government Work 
Report.161  It is only by association to social stability that environmental protection is 
included in these Government Work Reports which are so vital for the formulation of 
national policies, as it is listed as a sub-topic under social issues.  Based on this 
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observation, it is apparent that social pressure plays a fundamental role in ensuring 
environmental protection and, by association, trends in coal use.   Though officials have 
long stated that public contentedness and social stability are key goals of the government, 
it has only recently begun to acknowledge that heavy coal use and environmental 
degradation are causes of dissatisfaction.  One of the earliest documented mentions of 
this took place in 2014 when the Finance Secretary of the NDRC stated in an interview 
that the public longed for environmental protection and that current environmental 
problems are causing public incidents.162  Although this sentence would be common, and 
even tame, in American politics, it marks a noticeable change in the Chinese political 
dialogue.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
China is currently undergoing a period of transition away from its old ideals and 
goals towards a future largely unknown.  This transition is visible in the country’s coal 
use and policies.  Though official figures and the media seem to suggest that China is 
moving away from coal use in order to make way for other energy sources such as 
renewables, the country’s energy policy is vague and unclear.  The current coal policy 
provides only very broad objectives for the future, lacking definite figures and goals.  
Though these policies emphasize renewable resources, they do not have an equal 
emphasis on decreased coal consumption.  The country still lacks effective incentives for 
coal reduction, as evidenced by its low coal tax and current Cadre Evaluation System, 
which continues to prioritize economic growth over environmental protection.   
The purpose of this study was to pinpoint the rationale behind China’s current 
coal policy, however, in this aspect it was largely unsuccessful.  This is simply because, 
without taking part in the policy-making process, it is near impossible to tell what the 
decision-makers were thinking when they constructed the policies.  That being said, this 
paper does define several factors which likely play a large role in shaping China’s coal 
policy; including economic, environmental, and social.  The original hypothesis of this 
paper was that economic factors hold the largest clout in the formation and 
implementation of the country’s coal policy.  Again, for the reasons stated above, it is 
difficult to say if this hypothesis is correct.  However, after reviewing the situation from 
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multiple angles, it is clear that economic reasons do play an important role in this process.  
The low price of coal as compared to other energy sources is a major reason for this, and 
understandably so, as coal is at least three times cheaper than any other available energy 
source.  Further evidence can be seen in the policies themselves, which are unspecific and 
inconsistent, as well as the international negotiations of the country, which have thus far 
failed to result in binding agreements.  Whether or not China’s coal policy is still 
dominated by economic concerns, it appears to be in a stage of transition which is 
moving the country away from coal consumption and towards more environmentally safe 
options.  Research attributes this shift to rising environmental costs as well as social 
discontent and subsequent pressure on the government to amend the situation.  
Though this paper separates the reasons behind China’s coal policy into three 
main categories; economic, environmental, and social, they are all very much interrelated.  
Heavy coal use, which makes sense for the country economically, is the cause of vast 
environmental degradation, which causes both social unrest and billions of yuan in 
damages (around 2 percent of the country’s GDP in fact163), thereby undermining 
economic growth.  Decreased coal use leads to loss of jobs, especially in coal-producing 
provinces such as Shanxi and Shaanxi, which leads to social discontent.  Due to the many 
corresponding facets of the Chinese coal policy, it is important to view each of these 
categories in the context of each other and the bigger picture rather than in isolation.    
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Implications 
The direction that China takes with its coal regulatory policy will have broad 
implications into the future quality of life for the Chinese people. Environmental 
pollution has already permeated all aspects of life within the country and will continue to 
do so until the situation is resolved.  If current social trends continue, the public will 
become more and more discontented with environmental degradation and demand change 
in larger numbers.  The failure of the Chinese Central Party to respond to its pollution 
problem is therefore likely to serve as a major catalyst to social unrest. The government 
has ample reason to persist in heavy coal use, including convenience, low costs, and 
energy security; it is therefore up to the people and increased social pressure to challenge 
the government and force them to make drastic changes.  
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Chapter 7: The Future of Coal: Looking Ahead 
Evidence of recent policy changes in China can already be seen.  Environmental 
groups within the country have recently been granted more leverage and powers with 
new environmental laws passed in January of 2015, which now allow them to file 
lawsuits against polluters.164  A further point of optimism for China’s environment is the 
country’s new environmental minister, Chen Lijing, who has recently been cited saying 
that “a new law can't become a paper tiger, we want to let it become a weapon with steel 
teeth."165  From this statement it is apparent that China knows what needs to be done and 
is well on its way to achieving it.  With the world watching China’s ascent to a global 
superpower, China must implement systemic changes to regulate coal pollution and 
create a harmonious living environment for generations to come.  
13th Five Year Plan  
China’s 13th Five Year Plan is scheduled to be released in March of 2016 and will 
set the country’s guidelines for the period between 2016 and 2020.166  Based on the 12th 
FYP, as well as other government policies, it is logical to assume that this new plan will 
include an increased emphasis on social stability and reduced carbon and greenhouse gas 
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emissions.  However, if China continues in its policy trends, it seems likely that the plan 
will focus more on increasing the use of renewable resources instead of specifically 
limiting coal use.  This is likely to be the case because the renewable energy sector was 
named in the last FYP to be one of the seven “strategic emerging industries”.167  This 
new industry is expected to create 39 million jobs and a revenue of 3.7 trillion RMB, 
according to the Vice-Chairman of the NDRC.168  It can be assumed that the policy on 
coal use will be limited to a few sentences on increased use of underground coal 
gasification and desulphurization technology and not mention further caps on coal, as the 
issue can be sensitive within the country, especially among businesses and major coal-
producing provinces, all of whom rely on coal.  Although this section is likely to be 
lacking, increased use of renewable resources will inevitably result in the consequent 
reduction of coal use, therefore, the 13th FYP is an important step in moving the country 
forward.  
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